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*The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of Bard Coilegc In November  of  1994,  Republicans  for  the  first  time  in forty  years  took  control  of the 
House  of Representatives,  as well  as the  Senate  which  they  hadn’t  controlled  since  1987.  For 
conservatives  in the  Republican  party,  the  election  was  seen  as a triumph  of conservatism  over  the 
perceived  abuses  of liberalism  as they  had  found  expression  during  forty  years  of corrupt 
Democratic  rule.  Even  if these  claims  appear  to  be  overly  inflated,  the  election  of  1994  certainly 
did  bring  about  a profound  change  in the  composition  of the  U.S.  Congress,  which  at a minimum 
has  represented  a rejection  of the  incumbency.  Less  clear,  however,  is whether  the  rejection  of 
incumbency  was  a function  of the  perceived  corruption  of the  incumbency,  or whether  it truly 
signified  a desire  to  elect  the  other  party  out  of a sincere  belief  that  it best  reflects  the  views  and 
attitudes  of the  public. 
Anecdotally  what  we  know  about  this  election  is that  there  was  a serious  change  with 
profound  policy  implications.  Republicans  gained  53 House  seats  and  nine  Senate  seats.  Not  a 
single  GOP  incumbent  lost,  and  the  only  gains  made  by Democrats  in the  House  at all were  in four 
open  GOP  seats.  And  for  the  first  time  in forty  years  there  is a Republican  speaker  of the  House. 
Moreover,  this  all occurred  during  a midterm  election,  which  is quite  atypical  of the  pattern.  As 
Ornstein  and  Schenkenberg  have  noted,  Congressional  sweeps  usually  occur  either  during  the 
midterm  of  a second-term  president  or following  a sweeping  across-the-board  presidential  party 
victories,  neither  of which  occurred  in  1994.’  That  it did  occur  during  the  first  term  of the  Clinton 
’ Norman  J. Ornstein  and  Amy  L.  Schenkenberg,  “The  1995  Congress:  The  First  Hundred 
Days  and  Beyond,”  Political Science  Quarterly 110,2  (1995)  p.  184 
1 Presidency  might  suggest  that  the  sweep  was  in reality  a negative  vote  against  Clinton.  And  yet, 
this  fact  isn’t definitively  borne  out  by the  polls.  What  the  polls  do  suggest  is that  there  was 
growing  discontent  with  Congress  which  actually  preceded  this  election.  As  Ornstein  and 
Schenkenberg  observe:  “Voters  had  been  discontented  with  Congress  throughout  1994  and 
approached  the  election  with  a disapproval  rating  of Congress  of 73 percent,  one  of the  highest 
ever.  Cynical  towards  Washington  and  unhappy  with  their  own  lies, they  rejected  not  only  the 
status  quo,  but  specifically  the  Democrats.”  This  is essentially  the  argument  that  Congress  failed 
to  deliver  the  change  they  expected  when  they  elected  a Democratic  president  and  110 freshmen 
to  the  House.  The  election  of  1994,  then,  was  a continuation  of the  election  of  1992  where  the 
electorate  again  voted  for  change.  That  the  electorate  ousted  first-termers  just  as quickly  as it had 
elected  them  only  confirms  that  they  failed  to  deliver  on  their  promises.2  If this  is true,  the  election 
may  not  be  a realignment,  but  simply  a deviation  from  the  norm. 
Rejection  of  incumbency  could  be  said to  represent  a traditional  model  for  understanding 
what  happened,  and  in the  absence  of truly  conclusive  polling  data  it may  well  be the  only  model 
that  makes  any  real  sense.  But  there  is a second  school  of thought  which  holds  the  election  to 
perhaps  be  another  episode  in a pattern  towards  an electoral  realignment.  That  it was  a rejection 
of incumbency  is patently  clear.  That  it represents  a major  shift  in party  loyalty  on  the  part  of the 
electorate  is less  clear.  And  yet,  were  it to  be the  case  that  it was  indeed  a realignment  or  part  of 
one,  the  implications  would  be far greater  than  those  drawn  from  a traditional  model. 
2 Omstein  and  Schenkenberg,  “The  1995  Congress,”  p.  185 
2 The  Realignment  Model 
The  concept  of  electoral  realignment  has been  dominant  in the  political  science  literature 
for  over  forty  years  since  V.O.  Key’s seminal  Journal  ofPolitics  article  in  1955.  In  it, Key 
advanced  the  concept  of a “critical”  election  characterized  by an electoral  realignment  which 
would  be both  sharp  and  durable.  To  have  a critical  election,  electoral  involvement  would  have  to 
be relatively  high  “ in which  the  decisive  results  of the  voting  reveal  a sharp  alteration  of the  pre- 
existing  cleavage  within  the  electorate.”  More  importantly,  however,  the  realignment  would  have 
to  persist  over  a long  period  of time.3  Moreover,  the  realignment  would  have  to  occur  at all 
levels  of government.  Since  that  time,  political  scientists  have  relied  heavily  on that  concept  as a 
critical  index  of the  nature  of American  politics.  Walter  Dean  Burnham,  a key  figure  in the  further 
development  of realignment  theory,  is just  one  who  believes  that  realignment  theory  tells  us  quite 
a bit  about  the  shape  of the  American  political  universe.  The  reason  why  the  realignment  model 
has  been  attractive  has  been  in part  because  it appears  to  divide  much  of American  political 
history  into  clearly  demarcated  “party-system  eras.”  Work  on this  model  hasn’t  only  identified  the 
Civil War  and  New  Deal  eras,  but  the  1890s  as well.  They  tell us  quite  a bit  about  deep  political 
and  cultural  cleavages  in society.  As Bumham  explains: 
Critical  realignments  are moments  of intense,  comprehensive,  and  periodically  recurring 
systemic  change  in American  politics.  These  moments  will be more  or less  protracted 
depending  on  the  level  of development  in institutional  structure  which  exists  at the  time  of 
their  occurrence.  Periodically  recurring,  critical  realignments  are phenomena  unique  to  the 
American  political  system,  though  they  have  nonrecurrent  cognates  elsewhere,  including 
their  “first cousins,”  revolutions.  They  have  existed  in one  form  or  another  throughout 
3 V.O.  Key,  Jr.,  “A Theory  of Critical  Elections,”  Xke Journal  of Politics  17 (195 5), pp.  3-4 
3 American  political  history  from  the  American  Revolution  to  the  present.4 
Critical  elections  essentially  occur  when  politically  decisive  minorities  of politically  relevant 
populations  at any  given  time  stop  doing  what  they  have  traditionally  been  doing.  And  they  are 
exceptionally  important  and  enduring  consequences  for the  organization  of the  political  system. 
They  are  essentially  the  way  in which  the  political  system  is articulated.  They  can  be  said to 
represent  the  identity  and  articulation  of dominant  national  elites  and  the  identities  of prime 
extragovernmental  beneficiaries  of their  politics.  Critical  realignments  reflect  the  shape  and 
content  of  dominant  sets  of public  policy  agendas  and  outputs,  and  dominant  sets  of political  ideas 
justifying  and  integrating  them.  And  ultimately,  they  say something  about  the  identity,  size,  scope, 
and  effective  constitutional  role  of each  branch  of the  federal  government.5 
Still, this  begs  the  question  ofjust  what  such  a realignment  is, how  it is defined,  and  what 
it looks  like.  Realignment  theory  may  indeed  say something  about  the  nature  of American  politics, 
but  the  model  has been  ambiguous.  In part,  the  ambiguity  stems  from  Key’s own  later 
modification  of the  theory  when  he broadened  the  concept  of  “critical”  elections  to  include  secular 
shifts,  whereby  a gradual  realignment  might  occur  over  a period  of time,  as opposed  to  occurring 
in a sudden  shift.  An  election  might  then  be one  of many  reflecting  a secular  realignment  in which 
long-term  declines  in group  solidarity  most  likely  reflect  a variety  of underlying  factors.6  By 
4 Walter  Dean  Burnham,  “Critical  Realignment:  Dead  or Alive?”  in Byron  E.  Shafer  ed.,  The 
End  of Realignment?  Interpreting  American  Electoral  Eras  (Madison,  The  University  of 
Wisconsin  Press,  199 l),  p.  115 
5 Burnham,  “Critical  Realignment,”  p.  116 
6 V.O.  Key,  Jr.,  “Secular  Realignment  and  the  Party  System,”  l%e Journal  of Politics  21 
(1959):198-210 
4 broadening  the  concept  to  include  secular  realignments,  the  idea  of “critical  election”  effectively 
becomes  a larger  umbrella  that  could  conceivably  include  any number  of different  scenarios, 
including,  for  instance,  the  1994 election.  But  it may  also  create  a false  set  of expectations,  as it 
effectively  creates  a benchmark  for  every  election  which  may  or may  not  be realistic.  By  becoming 
focused  on  whether  each  election  is the  “one”  we  may  well  be overlooking  the  obvious,  or 
perhaps  what  is more  subtle. 
Earlier  Burnham  suggested  that  any working  definition  of the  concept  of “critical 
realignment”  must  eliminate  both  deviating  electoral  situations,  whereby  the  election  in question 
may  represent  a one-time  reaction  to  short-term  forces,  and  the  gradual  realignment.  “The  critical 
realignment  is characteristically  associated  with  short-lived  but  very  intense  disruptions  of 
traditional  patterns  of voting  behavior.  Majority  parties  become  minorities;  politics  which  was 
once  competitive  become  noncompetitive..  .”  The  critical  election  is characterized  by  abnormally 
high  intensity  with  the  prime  characteristic  being  that  there  has been  a basic  and  measurable 
transformation  in the  shape  of the  voting  universe.’  But  the  shift  need  not  all occur  at once.  And 
once  it does  occur  or  it is completed,  it effectively  defines  the  shape  of the  voting  universe  for 
years  to  come.  During  the  1960s  for  instance,  it was  believed  that  the  shape  of the  American 
voting  universe  then  was  by and  large  a product  of the  1928-36  realignment.8 
It is important  to  stress  that  a distinguishing  feature  of realignment  is durability.  A voter 
who  simply  crosses  the  line to  vote  against  his party  isn’t  considered  a realigning  voter  unless  s/he 
’ Walter  Dean  Burnham,  Critical  Elections  and  the Mainspring  of American  Politics  (New 
York,  W.W.  Norton  & Co.,  1970),  pp.  6 &  12 
’ Walter  Dean  Bumham,  “The  Changing  Shape  of the  American  Political  Universe,”  American 
Political  Science  Review,  59,l  (March  1965)  p. 23 
5 makes  a lasting  shift  of party  loyalty  and  attachment.  A temporary  shift  is merely  a deviating 
election.  But  when  enough  voters  deviate,  the  election  might  be classified  as a deviation  from  the 
political  norm.  “It  is when  the  political  norm  itself  changes  that  realignment  occurs.  The  concept 
applies,  then,  not  to  voting  behavior  as such,  but  to  what  underlies  voting  behavior  -- to  the  basic 
party  attachments  of the  voting  citizens.”  Other  distinguishing  criteria  of realignment  are 
magnitude  and  periodicity.’  Magnitude  speaks  to  the  sharpness  of the  political  cleavages  that  may 
have  produced  the  realignment.  But  periodicity  is also  critical,  for  the  basic  model  assumes  that 
elections  occur  in cycles  of every  thirty  years  or  so. Periodicity  is borne  out  by the  fact  that  the 
realignment  of the  1930s  was  only  thirty  six years  after  the  realignment  of the  1890s  which  was 
only  thirty  years  after  the  Civil war  realignment.  And  based  on  periodicity,  it was  expected  that  a 
new  realignment  would  occur  in the  1960s.  In line with  these  expectations,  political  commentator 
Kevin  Phillips  argued  that  the  election  of  1968 was  to  be just  the  beginning  in the  emergence  of 
the  Republican  party  as the  majority  party,  which  ultimately  would  supplant  the  New  Deal 
coalition  which  had  reigned  supreme  since  the  1930s.  In particular,  the  election  of Nixon  was 
significant  because  it represented  regional  party  shifts,  or the  beginning  stages  of  shifts, 
particularly  in the  American  heartland  and  the  South.  But  the  emerging  Republican  majority  was 
also  taking  place  in top  growth  states  like  California,  Arizona,  Texas,  and  Florida,  as well  as 
suburban  communities.‘0 
What,  then,  would  be the  cause  of  such  an electoral  shift?  According  to  Burnham,  a 
9  James  L.  Sundquist,  Dynamics  of the Party System: Alignment  and Realignment  of 
Political  Parties  in the United States (Washington,  The  Brookings  Institution,  1983)  pp.  4,5  & 6 
lo Kevin  Phillips,  The Emerging  Republican  Majority  (Garden  City,  Anchor  Books,  1970) 
6 critical  realignment  arises  out  of increasingly  social  maladjustments.  They  are the  products  of 
dynamic  transformations  in separately  developing  socioeconomic  systems.”  Realignments  occur 
when  an issue  or  set  of issues  polarize  the  political  landscape  that  great  concentrations  of voters 
are  motivated  to  change  their  party  affiliation.  According  to  Sundquist,  there  are  five  variables 
which  determine  the  form  and  scale  that  a realignment  takes.  The  first  is the  breadth  and  depth  of 
the  underlying  grievance.  The  second  is the  capacity  of the  proposed  remedy  to  provoke 
resistance.  The  third  is the  motivation  and  capacity  of the  party’s  leadership.  Fourth  is the  division 
of polar  forces  between  parties.  And  fifth  is the  strength  of the  ties  that  bind  voters  to  existing 
parties. 
Realignments  essentially  follow  a pattern.  They  have  their  origins  in the  rise  of new 
political  issues  or  clusters  of related  issues  which  have  the  potential  to  divide  and  polarize  the 
electorate  along  ideological  lines.  For  a realignment  to  occur,  the  new  issue  must  cut  across  the 
existing  line  of political  cleavage  and  for  it to  be a major  realignment  it must  be powerful  enough 
to  dominate  the  political  debate  and  polarize  the  community  as did  slavery  in the  185Os, the 
response  government  should  have  towards  the  hardships  faced  by farmers  and  inequalities  in 
wealth  and  income  distribution  among  regions  and  classes  in the  189Os, and  the  response 
government  should  take  towards  the  Great  Depression  during  the  1930s.  But  if there  is to  be  a 
realignment,  major  political  groups  must  take  distinct  and  opposing  positions  that  are  easily 
dramatized  and  understood.  The  community  must  be  so polarized  by the  issue  that  the  only 
apparent  solution  would  be to  overwhelmingly  replace  the  majority  party  with  the  minority  party, 
” Burnham,  Critical Elections  and the Mainspring  of American  Politics,  p . 13 5 
7 especially  if the  new  party  is predisposed  towards  the  new  issue. l2 The  minority  party  would  then 
become  the  majority  party  and  remain  so for  a long  period  of time,  thereby  ushering  in a new 
period  of political  stability. 
E.E.  Schattschneider  once  referred  to  such  forces  as the  mobilization  of bias.  Describing 
the  political  system  in terms  of political  conflicts  involving  two  sets  of actors  -- activists  and 
spectators  --  Schattschneider  argued  that  those  actively  involved  in a conflict,  especially  if it had 
reached  the  point  of  stalemate,  would  seek  to  draw  the  spectators  into  it by mobilizing  bias.  This 
would  occur  on  both  sides  of the  conflict.  The  side  able to  mobilize  the  most  support  for  its 
position  might  conceivably  achieve  political  victory  as the  conflict  would  effectively  be resolved 
through  peaceful  means,  i.e.  the  political  process.  l3 This  resolution,  of course,  could  assume  two 
different  forms.  One  form  would  be for  political  factions  to  influence  the  political  debate  as it 
takes  place  in Congress  with  the  end  result  being  a vote  in their  favor.  The  other  would  be to 
influence  the  debate  by bringing  about  a massive  change  in the  composition  of Congress,  with  the 
end  result  again  being  a vote  in their  favor.  In either  case,  the  issue  doesn’t  simply  crop  up 
overnight;  rather  it builds  over  a period  of time  climaxing  in what  Sundquist  calls  a realignment 
crisis.  A realignment  crisis  is precipitated  when  moderate  centrists  in one  or both  of the  parties 
lose  control  of party  nominations  and  policy  to  one  or the  other  of the  polar  forces,  and  it is when 
these  polar  forces  gain  control  that  a realignment  crisis  is precipitated.  A realignment  then  reaches 
its climax  in one  or  more  critical  elections  that  center  on the  issue.  But  the  realigning  process  may 
I2 Sundquist,  Dynamics  of the Party  System,  pp.  41,  298-3 11 
l3 E.E.  Schattschneider,  I;he Semisovereign  People:  A Realist  s  View of America  (New  York, 
Holt,  Rhinehart,  1960) 
8 actually  extend  over  a considerable  period  of time  both  before  and  after  the  critical  election.  It is 
after  the  critical  election  -- or the  election  in which  voters  make  a clear  choice  -- on  an issue 
which  has  polarized  the  country  that  polarization  gives  way  to  conciliation.  As this  happens,  the 
political  parties  move  from  poles  towards  the  center  and  the  distance  between  them  is again 
narrowed.  Then  as new  issues  arise  in the  future  which  coincide  with  the  existing  line  of political 
cleavage,  party  cohesion  is strengthened  and  the  distance  between  the  parties  is increased,  thereby 
reinforcing  the  existing  alignment.  l4 
Still,  none  of this  dismisses  much  of the  controversy  surrounding  the  concept.  As Joel 
Selby  has  observed,  critical  realignment  theory  has been  troubled  for  some  time  now.  Though  at 
one  time  it provided  precise  markers  signifying  profound  shies  in American  politics,  this  precision 
no  longer  exists.  “The  theory  has  not  been  able to  account  for  what  has  happened  over  the  past 
generation  of American  politics,  despite  the  often  frustrating  search  by scholars  to  locate  the 
electoral  realignment  that  was  due  in  1964,  1968,  or thereabout.  ” Rather  there  has  been  increasing 
electoral  fragmentation  since  the  1960s  due  to  a decline  of party  loyalty.”  And  Ladd  too  has 
suggested  that  political  scientists’  preoccupation  with  the  concept  over  the  past  thirty  five  years 
has been  unfortunate.  In part,  the  problem  stems  from  a desire  to  make  sense  out  of ticket 
splitting.  For  realignment  perception  holds  split  outcomes  -- ticket  splitting  -- to  be  “unnatural” 
because  periodic  realignments  are  supposed  to  culminate  in a majority  party  becoming  ascendent 
across  several  levels  and  institutions  of American  government.  And  yet  “split results  are  a 
l4 Sundquist,  Dynamics  of  the Party  System,  pp.  3 13-321 
ls Joel  H.  Selby,  “Beyond  Realignment  and  Realignment  Theory”  American  Political  Eras, 
1789-1989,”  in Shafer  ed.,  The End  of Realignment? 
9 perfectly  natural  response  within  a polity  whose  defining  feature  is the  elaborate  separation  of 
political  institutions  and  authority.  “16  As Nardulli  has  observed,  “The  notion  of a critical 
realignment  is an aggregate  level  concept  that  refers  to  an abrupt,  large,  and  enduring  form  of 
change  in prevailing  electoral  patterns,  one  that  is initiated  by a critical  election  and  results  in a 
significantly  different  partisan  balance  in the  electorate.”  In  as much  as this  is clear,  what  is less 
clear  is that  in order  to  understand  the  role  critical  elections  play  in restructuring  electoral 
patterns,  issues  of time  and  space  must  also  be  considered.  Those  who  study  realignment  need  to 
look  carefully  at long  time  frames  and  be  sensitive  to  the  fact  that  enduring  critical  change  can 
assume  a variety  of forms.  Therefore,  it may  not  be terribly  realistic  to  expect  that  the  entire 
electorate  will  “respond  simultaneously  and  uniformly  to  the  type  of  stimuli  that  will generate  a 
critical  realignment  in electoral  patterns.“17 
To  expect  as much  is to  assume  a certain  degree  of  homogeneity  in a society  with  vast 
geopolitical  diversity.  Nardulli  thus  suggests  that  a subnational  approach  to  understanding  critical 
realignments  may  be more  useful.  The  argument  for  this  is the  fact  that  there  has  never  been  a 
truly  national  realignment,  with  the  possible  exception  of  1932.18 And  on  this  point  most  scholars 
would  seem  to  agree.  For  Sundquist,  the  election  of  1936 was  when  President  Franklin  Roosevelt 
achieved  his most  stunning  victory,  thus  marking  the  climax  of the  1932  realignment  -- the  New 
l6 Everett  Carl1 Ladd,  “Like  Waiting  for  Godot:  The  Uselessness  of Realignment”  for 
Understanding  Change  in Contemporary  American  Politics.”  in Shafer  ed.,  The End of 
Realignment,  pp.  27  and  30 
l7 Peter  F. Nardulli,  “The  Concept  of a Critical  Realignment,  Electoral  Behavior,  and  Political 
Change,”  American  Political  Science Review  89,l  (March  1995), p.  11 
l8 Nardulli,  “The  Concept  of  a Critical  Realignment,  Electoral  Behavior,  and  Political  Change, 
p.  13 
10 Deal  realignment.  Everything  that  has  happened  since  can then  be understood  as a later  phase  of 
that  critical  election.  l9 Or  at the  very  least  it is what  happened  in  1932 which  has  set the  tone  for 
what  has  followed. 
Issues  in  1994  Election 
Where,  then,  would  the  1994  election  fit into  realignment  model?  The  characteristics 
would  have  to  conform  to  the  following  criteria:  First  of all, it would  have  to  be clear  that  there 
was  such  an issue  or  set  of issues  which  so polarized  the  political  community  that  the  only 
solution  was  to  sweep  the  Democrats  out  and  replace  them  with  Republicans.  And  if such  an issue 
could  be  said  to  exist,  it is one  which  would  have  to  have  been  simmering  for  some  time.  Second, 
it would  have  to  be clear  that  electoral  results  are the  product  of a sizeable  majority  of the 
political  community  coming  out  to  cast  votes.  In other  words,  for  the  1994  election  to  have  been 
a realigning  election,  voter  turnout  would  have  to  have  been  considerable.  And  thirdly,  it would 
have  to  be  clear  that  the  change  in composition  of the  party  in the  electorate  is durable.  That  is, is 
the  Republican  victory  simply  a function  of a majority  of the  electorate  voting  Republican,  or that 
they  changed  their  party  affiliation  and  became  Republican  and  then  proceeded  to  vote  for  their 
new  party’s  candidates  and  platform?  The  two  are by no  means  the  same.  If only  the  former,  we 
at most  have  a deviation  from  the  political  norm.  If the  latter,  however,  we  might  well  have  a 
realigning  election,  but  only  if it is clear  that  the  new  party  affiliation  will be  sustained  over  time. 
And  this  is something  that  cannot  necessarily  be known  until  years  into  the  future.  But  even  if 
traces  of realignment  can  be identified,  we  are left to  address  the  question  ofjust  where  the 
l9 Sundquist,  Dynamics  of the Party System, pp.  214  & 240 
11 realignment  may  have  been.  Was  it a national  realignment,  or was  it a subnational  one?  And  in 
this  vein,  we  might  see  that  there  are  some  apparent  elements  of a realignment,  which  don’t 
completely  encompass  the  entire  electorate. 
For  Bumham,  the  1994  earthquake,  as he refers  to  it, does  have  many  of the 
characteristics  of “an  old-style  partisan  critical  realignment.  Chief  among  these  characteristics  of 
realignment  are the  durability  and  comprehensiveness  of the  proposed  new  order  of things.”  And 
while  the  future  cannot  be known  for  sure,  there  are nonetheless  reasons  to  believe  that  the  1994 
election  does  constitute  a rare  election.  The  first  thing  to  note  is that  the  election  involved 
Republican  surges  at all levels  of government;  that  they  occurred  in the  states  as well  as the 
national  government.  There  were  many  more  vacancies  among  Democrats  than  Republican 
gubernatorial  positions.  Moreover,  the  Republicans  lost  no  incumbents  and  only  one  open 
governorship.20 
According  to  a recent  study  by Tuchfarber  et al., the  GOP  victory  raises  four  key 
questions  about  the  significance  of the  1994  election:  1) Did  the  outcome  turn  primarily  on  the 
failure  to  vote  by key  blocs  of the  Democratic  party’s  constituency?  2) Does  the  election  reflect 
only  a short-term  rebellion  against  the  Democratic  party  in general  and  Bill Clinton  in particular? 
3) Were  the  results  due  to  enduring  structural  shifts  in the  parties’  electoral  coalition?  And  4) 
Was  the  1994  election  a “critical  election”  that  realignment  has  occurred?  As they  found,  the  more 
people  indicated  that  they  disapproved  of the job  done  by Congress,  the  more  likely  they  were  to 
2o  Walter  Dean  Burnham,  “Realignment  Lives:  The  1994 Earthquake  and  Its  Implications”  in 
Colin  Campbell  and  Bert  A. Rockman,  ed.,  The Clinton Presidency:  First Appraisals  (Chatham, 
NJ;  Chatham  House  Publishers,  1996)  pp.  363,  365 
12 vote  for  GOP  candidates  in  1994.2’ And  yet,  if it is true  that  the  public  was  primarily  displeased 
about  the  performance  of  Congress,  it doesn’t  at all follow  that  this  was  a realignment  consistent 
with  the  model.  For  one  feature  of realignment  theory  is its cyclical  nature,  whereby  each 
realignment  represents  a “critical  election”  with  a new  party  system  occurring  every  thirty  years  or 
so.  But  as Tuchfarber  et al. note,  the  data  on  party  identification  doesn’t  clearly  confirm  the  shift 
to  a Republican  majority  in the  electorate,  though  there  has been  some  movement  in that 
direction.  Still,  they  believe  that  even  if the  election  cannot  be  said to  easily  fit into  the  model  of 
realignment,  it was  probably  phase  one  of a “critical  election”  period,  and  that  it will take  the  next 
few  elections  to  determine  whether  the  country  is indeed  in a new  period  of Republican 
dominance  or  if it is still in a period  of electoral  dealignment.22 
Ladd  too  has  offered  a somewhat  ambiguous  answer  to  the  question  of whether  the  1994 
election  was  a realignment,  While  acknowledging  that  the  results  were  clear  and  unequivocal  -- 
that  the  Republicans  made  serious  gains  -- its place  in the  longer-term  evolution  of American 
partisan  competition  isn’t  nearly  as clear.  Despite  all their  gains,  Republicans  are  only  at parity 
with  Democrats  in terms  of party  identification.  Republicans  hold  only  a minority  of  state 
legislative  seats,  and  they  have  won  a majority  in the  House  of Representatives  only  three  times  in 
64 years.  Moreover,  they  do  not  have  the  same  majority  status  that  the  Democrats  had  during  the 
New  Deal  era.  “What’s  more,  given  the  relative  weakness  of voter  ties  to  political  parties  and  the 
continuing  growth  of independent  voting,  it’s by no  means  certain  that  the  United  States  will  ever 
21  Alfred  J. Tuchfarber,  Stephen  E. Bennett,  Andrew  E.  Smith  and  Eric  W. Rademacher,  “The 
Republican  Tidal  Wave  of  1994:  Testing  Hypotheses  About  Realignment,  Restructuring,  and 
Rebellion,”  PS:  Political  Science  & Politics  28,4  (December  1995)  pp.  689-690 
22  Tuchfarber  et al.,  “The  Republican  Tidal  Wave  of  1994,”  p.  694 
13 again  have  a majority  party  in the  complete  sense  that  the  Republicans  were  a majority  from  the 
1890s  through  the  1920s  and  the  Democrats  from  the  1930s  through  the  early  1960~.“~~ 
Perhaps  the  election  of  1994  is less  of a realignment  and  more  a continuation  of a process 
of dealignment  whereby  voters,  increasingly  more  independent,  pay  less  and  less  attention  to  party 
affiliation  and  loyalty.  For  Ladd,  the  New  Deal  party  system  which  marked  the  1932  realignment 
was  a creature  of an industrial  era which  no  longer  exists.  During  this  industrial  era the  dominant 
impulses  of industrialization  were  centralization  and  enhancing  government  power.  But  in the 
postindustrial  era,  we  have  seen  the  opposite  occur.  What  has  occurred  in the  economic  and 
technological  spheres  has  been  dispersion  and  decentralization.  In light  of this  it is only  an 
anathema  to  continue  centralizing  political  power  in national  government  bureaucracies. 
Therefore,  a key  characteristic  of elections  since  1932 has been  a partisan  argument  over  just 
what  the  role  of government  in society  should  be.  What  has  occurred  over  the  years  is that 
Americans,  while  not  necessarily  turning  against  government,  have  become  more  skeptical  about 
its efficacy.24 In truth,  for  the  Republican  claim  that  this  election  marked  the  beginning  of a 
“revolution”  to  be  credible  it would  have  to  follow  that  voters  were  specifically  voting  on  the 
basis  of party  ideology  as it was  presented  in the  “Contract  with  America.”  And  yet  surveys  show 
that  most  Americans  were  simply  unfamiliar  with  the  “Contract”  and  its specific  provisions.  By 
the  end  of November  1994,  only  34 percent  of Americans  had  heard  of the  “Contract.”  But  of 
those  who  had  heard  of it -- the  attentive  group  -- 56 percent  said they  favored  it; 23  percent  said 
23  Everett  Carl1 Ladd,  “The  1994  Congressional  Elections:  the  Postindustrial  Realignment 
Continues,”  Political  Science  Quarterly  1  10, 1(1995), p.  3 
24  Ladd,  “The  1994  Congressional  Elections,”  pp.  4-9 
14 they  were  opposed;  seven  percent  said they  had  mixed  feelings;  and  I4  percent  simply  had  no 
opinion.  25  On the  other  hand,  it is possible  that  the  “Contract”  symbolizes  a desire  to  limit 
government,  and  one  that  the  public  identifies  with  even  if it doesn’t  necessarily  understand  what 
limiting  government  would  mean. 
According  to  Ladd,  survey  data  does  show  that  there  was  strong  public  support  for 
virtually  all “Contract”  ideas  pertaining  to  limiting  government.  Americans  haven’t  resolved  their 
ambivalence  about  the  modern  state.  On the  contrary,  the  election  of  1994  displays  important 
continuity  with  the  past.  For  one  thing,  the  South  continued  its long-term  move  from  the 
Democratic  camp  even though  blacks  all over  were  for  the  most  part  Democrats.  Also  Catholics 
along  with  Southern  white  Protestants  continued  from  1992 their  long  drift  from  decisive 
Democratic  loyalties.  Again  there  was  a gender  gap,  as more  women  were  Democrats  and  more 
men  were  Republican.  And  Democrats  again  did best  among  those  with  little  formal  education 
and  among  those  with  the  most  years  in school.  The  South  in  1994  continued  its long-term  move 
towards  the  GOP.  A majority  of House  members  elected  from  the  South  were  Republicans.  By 
contrast,  in  1952  only  8%  of Republican  House  members  were  from  the  old  confederacy.  By 
1968,  the  number  was  up  to  19%,  and  after  1994,  Southern  Republicans  comprise  33%  of the 
party’s  House  seats.  And  yet,  the  South  has  still a long  way  to  go  in its gradual  realignment,  for 
Democrats  still hold  62%  of the  region’s  state  legislative  seats.  And  yet,  this  isn’t  to  say that  no 
realignment  is occurring,  for  Ladd  does  conclude  that  the  U.S.  “Is  somewhere  in the  middle 
stages  of  a major  political  realignment,  one  perceptible  in large  part  by the  shifts  from  an industrial 
25  David  W. Moore,  Lydia  Saad,  Leslie  McAneny  and  Frank  Newport,  “Contract  with 
America,”  K+e Gallup Poll Monthly  (November  1994)  p.  19 
15 to  a postindustrial  setting.“26  What  we  might  be left  with  is that  some  characteristics  of the 
election  fit into  the  model,  while  others  clearly  do  not.  As much  as there  may  have  been  stronger 
sentiment  against  the  Democrats,  it isn’t  clear  that  such  cleavages  rise to  the  level  of divisiveness 
characteristic  of the  political  cleavages  during  the  previous  realignment  periods. 
Perhaps  the  real  story  is what  is happening  at the  subnational  level,  particularly  in the 
South.  And  if the  South  is where  the  real  story  is,  1994  does  not  represent  a critical  election; 
rather  it represents  another  episode  in a process  which  has been  underway  since  1948  Many  of 
the  shifis  over  the  years  have  been  gradual  ones.  But  in the  South,  the  drift  away  from  the  1930s 
coalition  began  in  1948 when  the  national  Democratic  party  changed  course  on  the  issue  of civil 
rights. 27  Or  as Sundquist  has  noted,  the  party  system  in the  South  was  plunged  into  its realignment 
crisis  when  in  1948 President  Truman  sent  his civil rights  proposals  to  Congress.  All at once  the 
Democratic  party  was  polarized  and  mostly  on  regional  lines.  At  one  end  of the  party  spectrum 
was  a civil  rights  polar  force  and  their  liberal  allies;  at the  other  end  was  a polar  force  of  Southern 
white  resistance,  determined  to  bolt  the  party  when  and  if ardent  civil rights  advocates  in the  north 
attained  clear  control.  Then  there  were  the  moderate  centrists  in the  middle  who  sought  to  find 
areas  of compromise  that  would  maintain  the  party’s  unity.28 
Of course,  all this  may  be true.  Trends  which  began  in the  1940  and  were  evident  in  1968 
may  well  have  continued  in  1994.  But  it isn’t clear  from  the  data  that  this  election  was  a critical 
26  Ladd,  “The  1994  Congressional  Elections,”  pp.  10-2 1, 24 
27  See  Everett  Carl1 Ladd,  “The  1992 Vote  for  President  Clinton:  Another  Brittle  Mandate?” 
Political  Science  Quarterly  108,l  (1993)  p. 3 
28  Sundquist,  Dynamics  of the Party System, pp.  353-354; also  see Phillips,  The Emerging 
Republican  Majority 
16 election  as defined  by the  realignment  model,  or that  it necessarily  continues  the  trend  begun  in 
1968.  What  occurred  in  1994 was  a significant  change  in the  composition  of Congress.  The 
leadership  of the  Republican  party  would  like the  public  to  believe  that  because  the  victory  was  so 
sweeping  that  it essentially  amounted  to  a Revolution.  Moreover,  because  not  a single  Republican 
incumbent  lost  and  most  who  did  lose  were  those  liberal  Democrats  who  supported  Clinton  and 
may  have  even  voted  for  his tax  increase  in  1993,  the  election  was  in essence  a repudiation  of 
liberalism  in general  and  Clinton  in particular.  The  other  possibility  is that  the  election  simply 
represented  a continuation  of dealignment,  the  process  whereby  more  and  more  people  have  been 
defecting  from  the  political  parties.  The  other  question  which  really  has  not  been  addressed  is that 
of voter  turnout,  for  were  there  to  be a realignment  turnout  would  have  to  be high.  But  turnout 
over  the  years  has  tended  to  decline  and  turnout  during  midterm  elections  has  always  been  less. 
The  issue  of voter  turnout,  however,  isn’t  merely  a matter  of looking  at how  the  electorate 
as a whole  voted.  Rather  it requires  breaking  down  the  electorate  into  its component  parts  and 
examining  how  each  subgroup  within  the  electorate  voted.  On the  basis  of  data  from  the  National 
Election  Studies  (NES)  for  a twenty  eight  year  period  from  1952-1980,  for  example,  Warren 
Miller  discovered  a significant  realignment  in the  South  among  white  male  voters.  Traditionally 
known  for  single-party  dominance,  the  beginning  of the  end  of that  dominance  among  Southern 
white  male  voters  started  shortly  after  Kennedy’s  election  in  1960.  Only  twenty  years  later,  the 
80-20  division  between  northern  and  southern  states  in favor  of the  Democratic  party  had  been 
replaced  by near  parity  for  the  Republicans.  At  least  among  white  males,  there  would  appear  to 
have  been  a classic  realignment  in the  South.  And  yet,  this  was  more  than  offset  by the  influx  of 
black  voters  into  the  Democratic  party  between  1960  and  1968.  So  in an attempt  to  understand 
17 what  might  have  contributed  to  the  evidence  suggestive  of a party  realignment  during  the  Reagan 
years,  Miller  concludes  that  it was  black  nonvoters;  not  black  voters.29  In  other  words,  what  might 
appear  to  be  a realignment  really  isn’t  because  a sizeable  subgroup  in the  population  chose  not  to 
participate.  The  classic  realignment  model  requires  that  voter  turnout  be  sizeable.  Moreover,  it 
would  appear  to  underscore  the  need  to  be clear  about  just  what  the  voting  patterns  were  in any 
election  that  becomes  the  subject  of a realignment  analysis. 
Ambiguity  in Data 
The  only  way  to  know  whether  the  election  fits into  the  model  or  elements  of it is to 
examine  how  the  public  felt  about  the  issues.  We  can gauge  this  to  some  extent  by looking  at the 
survey  data.  Though  it may  provide  a basis  for  plausible  inference,  polling  data  is by no  means 
absolutely  conclusive.  For  one  thing,  polls  aren’t  always  consistent  with  one  another.  We  may 
have  answers  to  questions  that  were  raised,  but  some  of the  questions  that  weren’t  asked  could  be 
just  as important,  and  because  they  weren’t  asked  we  have  no  means  by which  to  measure.  For 
the  purposes  of this  analysis,  I have  chosen  to  look  at two  data  bases.  One  is a published  survey  of 
the  Gallup  organization,  a well  established  national  polling  organization.  The  other  is micro  data 
from  the  National  Election  Studies  (NES),  sponsored  by the  Survey  Research  Center  and  the 
Center  for  Political  Studies  of the  Institute  for  Social  Research  at the  University  of Michigan. 
Whereas  Gallup  asked  most  of the  standard  questions,  the  NES  tended  to  be more 
comprehensive.  Though  there  is some  variation  between  them,  there  is considerable  consistency. 
29  Warren  E. Miller,  Party  Identification,  Realignment,  and  Party  Voting:  Back  to  the 
Basics,”  American  Political  Science  Review  85,2  (June  1991):557-568 
18 But  despite  the  consistency,  there  is perhaps  ample  variation  for  different  impressions  to  be 
formed.  One  of the  reasons  for  choosing  these  specific  data  bases  is that  they  may  also 
demonstrate  the  divide  between  politicians,  journalists  and  political  pundits  who  would  be more 
inclined  to  rely  on  popular  surveys  on the  one  hand,  and  scholars  who  tend  to  rely  on  a more 
comprehensive  data  base  which  provides  an internal  basis  for  variables  to  be  checked  against  one 
another  on  the  other  hand.  What  neither  poll  shows,  however,  is the  magnitude  and  intensity 
which  could  so  polarize  the  electorate  that  this  election  could  necessarily  conform  to  the  criteria 
of a classic  realigning  election. 
The  case  for  a realignment,  at a minimum,  must  rest  on the  premise  that  people  were 
dissatisfied  with  how  things  were  going.  Some  might  suggest  that  dissatisfaction  is measured  by 
disapproval  over  President  Clinton’s  performance  in office  specifically.  It is one  thing  to  be 
dissatisfied  with  how  things  are going  and  quite  another  to  assume  that  because  things  aren’t 
going  well  it is because  of disapproval  over  the  president’s  performance.  Just  prior  to  the  election, 
66 percent  of those  polled  by the  Gallup  organization  indicated  that  they  were  dissatisfied  with 
how  things  were  going  in the  U.S.  at the  time.3o Only  30 percent  indicated  that  they  were 
satisfied,  while  four  percent  had  no  opinion.  And  yet,  on the  question  of whether  they  approved  of 
President  Clinton’s  performance  in office,  there  was  an even  split with  46  percent  approval  and  46 
percent  disapproval,  and  eight  percent  having  no  opinion.  The  problem  is that  it doesn’t 
necessarily  follow  that  the  general  dissatisfaction  over  how  things  are going  is a function  of the 
President’s  performance.  Or for  that  matter,  it isn’t entirely  clear just  what  it means  not  to  be 
3o  This  data  and  all the  Gallup  data  that  follows  is drawn  from  “Gallup  Short  Subjects,”  The 
Gallup PollMonthly  (November  1994):35-53 
19 satisfied  with  how  things  are  running  in the  country.  On the  other  hand,  when  asked  whether  they 
had  a favorable  or  unfavorable  opinion  of Clinton  the  person,  50 percent  had  a favorable  opinion; 
47  percent  had  an unfavorable  opinion;  and  three  percent  had  no  opinion.  The  NES  survey 
following  the  election  actually  showed  Clinton’s  approval  rating  to  be higher.  When  asked 
whether  they  approved  or  disapproved  of the  way  he was  handling  his job  as President,  48.2 
percent  said that  they  approved  and  46.1  percent  said that  they  disapproved.  Another  4.9  percent 
simply  did  not  know.  And  on  the  issue  of Clinton  personally,  respondents  were  asked  to  rate  him 
on  a feeling  thermometer  ranging  from  0 (least  favorable)  to  100 (most  favorable).  Only  42.2 
percent  of the  respondents  fell into  the  O-50 range,  but  57.1  percent  fell in the  5 1 to  100 range. 
What,  then,  does  it mean  to  say that  the  1994  election  was  in essence  a repudiation  of 
Clinton?  When  asked  whether  they  would  be more  likely  to  support  a candidate  who  either 
supports  Clinton  or  opposes  him,  41 percent  said that  they  would  support  a candidate  who 
supported  Clinton  while  46 percent  indicated  that  they  would  not.  At the  same  time,  eight 
percent  said  that  it was  not  a factor  and  five  percent  had  no  opinion.  When  asked  in the  NES  how 
oRen  their  respective  representatives  supported  Clinton’s  legislative  proposals,  57.2  percent 
didn’t  know  or weren’t  sure;  11.4 percent  said more  than  halfl, 5.5 percent  said  about  half  and  9.5 
percent  said  less  than  half  The  difference  between  polls  may  also  render  this  criterion  suspect.  If 
a high  percentage  of voters  aren’t  even  aware  of whether  their  representative  supported  Clinton 
or  not,  how  is it really  possible  to  infer  that  because  people  were  dissatisfied  with  Clinton  they 
then  voted  against  those  who  were  either  members  of his party  or  supported  him  as a means  of 
demonstrating  their  disapproval?  But  then  it doesn’t  necessarily  follow  that  like  or  dislike  of 
Clinton  would  constitute  a sole  criterion  for  how  to  vote.  For  those  for whom  Clinton  was  a 
20 factor  in the  Gallup  poll,  when  pressed  on the  matter  adamancy  appeared  to  dissipate.  Of the  41 
percent  who  were  pro-Clinton,  only  28 percent  indicated  that  they  felt very  strongly,  while  13 
percent  did  not.  And  of the  46  percent  who  were  anti-Clinton,  only  35%  indicated  that  they  felt 
strongly  while  eleven  percent  did  not.  But  even  if it were  true  that  the  1994  election  was  definitely 
an anti-Clinton  vote,  it still isn’t at all clear  what  they  were  voting  against.  Are  they  voting  against 
him  because  of his personality,  his ideology,  his character,  or  his politics? 
One  obvious  dissatisfaction  might  be the  economy,  but  this  issue  didn’t necessarily  yield 
any  real  consistency  in responses  either.  For  instance,  when  Gallup  asked  whether  their  family’s 
financial  situation  was  better,  worse  or the  same  today  compared  with  two  years  ago,  26 percent 
said  it was  better;  23 percent  said  it was  worse;  50 percent  said it was  about  the  same;  and  only 
one  percent  had  no  opinion.  And  yet,  when  asked  how  they  felt  about  President  Clinton’s  handling 
of the  economy,  5 1 percent  said that  they  disapproved;  43 percent  said they  approved;  and  six 
percent  said they  had  no  opinion.  This  was  actually  quite  a change  from  February  of  1993  when 
only  35 percent  disapproved  and  20 percent  had  no  opinion.  Then  the  approval  rating  was  45 
percent.  But  the  NES  survey  actually  showed  more  people  to  approve  of Clinton’s  handling  of the 
economy  than  disapprove.  Here  48.3  percent  approved,  44.1  percent  disapproved,  and  7.2 
percent  simply  did  not  know.  Although  it doesn’t  follow  that  there  is necessarily  any  ringing 
endorsement  of Clinton’s  handling  of the  economy,  the  closeness  of the  numbers  would  also 
suggest  that  the  economy  perhaps  was  not  that  critical  an issue  in  1994,  or  at least  Clinton’s 
involvement  in it. But  it is also  easy  to  see how  the  difference  in numbers  might  lead  some  to 
believe  that  Clinton’s  handling  of the  economy  was  a factor.  That  is, it is perhaps  a factor  in the 
Gallup  poll,  and  less  of one,  if one  at all, in the  NES.  But  even  if it is a factor  in the  Gallup  poll, 
21 the  numbers  are  still close  enough  to  believe  that  this  alone  could  not  have  been  an issue  of any 
great  magnitude. 
From  the  Gallup  poll,  at least,  it would  appear  reasonable  to  conclude  that  those  who  had 
approved  of Clinton’s  handling  of the  economy  for  the  most  part  continued  to  approve,  while  the 
growth  in disapproval  appears  to  have  come  from  those  who  earlier  had  no  opinion.  And  yet, 
when  asked  whether  they  would  prefer  to  return  to  say President  Reagan’s  economic  policies  or 
continue  with  the  current  policies,  only  34 percent  indicated  that  there  should  be a return  while  48 
percent  indicated  that  the  country  should  continue  with  the  current  policies.  Eleven  percent 
indicated  neither  and  seven  percent  simply  had  no  opinion.  Thus  we  are  left with  the  puzzling 
question  of why  would  most  of those  who  aren’t happy  with  Clinton’s  handling  of the  economy 
necessarily  want  to  maintain  the  current  economic  policies?  These  policies,  after  all, are  Clinton 
administration  policies.  It is also  worth  noting,  however,  that  nowhere  in the  survey  were  they 
asked  what  type  of economic  policies  they  would  like to  see.  If there  is any  monumental  policy 
initiative  which  preceded  the  election  in which  the  Democratic  leadership  played  a role,  it was  the 
issue  of healthcare  reform  -- the  very  issue  that  brought  Clinton  to  power  along  with  110 other 
freshmen  members  of Congress.  And  yet,  it isn’t  entirely  clear  from  the  polling  data  as to  whether 
this  was  in any way  decisive. 
The  Gallup  poll  did  not  really  address  itself  to  the  issue  of healthcare  reform,  but  the  NES 
did.  When  asked  whether  they  approved  or disapproved  of Clinton’s  handling  of health  care 
reform,  59 percent  said that  they  disapproved,  while  only  33.4  approved.  Another  7.2 percent 
simply  did  not  know.  Still,  it isn’t  at all clear  what  it means.  Does  the  high  disapproval  stem  from 
the  specifics  of the  Clinton  healthcare  reform  proposals  which  the  public  may  not  have  been  happy 
22 with,  or  does  it stem  from  the  failure  of the  administration  to  secure  reform  in any  form?  The  two 
are by no  means  the  same.  Interestingly,  the  disapproval  ratings  were  even  higher  over  Congress’s 
handling  of health  care  reform.  When  asked  whether  they  approved  or disapproved  of the  way 
Congress  was  handling  healthcare  reform,  70.4  said that  they  disapproved,  while  only  23.7 
percent  said  that  they  approved.  Another  5.7 percent  simply  did  not  know.  On the  one  hand,  we 
might  infer  that  a majority  of respondents  simply  did  not  approve  of the  Democratic  plan  for 
healthcare  reform.  But  on the  other  hand,  we  might  infer  that  a majority  of respondents  were 
dissatisfied  over  the  fact  that  the  Democratically  controlled  Congress  was  simply  unable  to  work 
with  a Democratic  President.  Such  an inference  might  indeed  flow  logically  from  the  fact  that 
there  were  many  other  proposals  for  healthcare  reform  coming  from  Congress,  and  especially 
from  the  Democrats. 
Despite  the  fact  that  most  people  in the  NES  survey  had  health  insurance  and  were 
satisfied,  when  asked  how  they  felt  about  the  country’s  healthcare  system  as a whole,  satisfaction 
actually  declined.  Only  6.1  percent  indicated  that  they  were  satisfied  and  another  29.1  percent 
indicated  that  they  were  somewhat  satisfied.  But  37.5  percent  indicated  that  they  were  somewhat 
dissatisfied  and  another  24.5  percent  indicated  that  they  were  very  dissatisfied,  which  would 
suggest  that  for  at least  62 percent  healthcare  reform  may  have  been  an important  enough  issue 
upon  which  to  reject  the  Democratic  Congress.  When  asked  whether  government  should  provide 
a government  insurance  plan  which  would  cover  all medical  expenses  for  everybody,  more  people 
leaned  in the  direction  of private  insurance  as opposed  to  government  provision..  When 
respondents  were  asked  this  question,  they  were  asked  to  place  themselves  on  a continuum. 
About  34.9  percent  leaned  in the  direction  of government  provision,  37.2  percent  leaned  in the 
23 direction  of private  insurance,  and  19.2 percent  were  right  in the  middle.  Still, the  number  of 
respondents  favoring  private  provision  is not  so overwhelming  as to  believe  that  a healthcare 
reform  proposal,  even  with  the  appearance  of big bureaucracy,  would  so motivate  people  to  vote 
for  the  minority  party. 
Following  the  election,  the  Republican  majority  made  the  claim  that  the  electorate  was 
rejecting  the  excesses  of liberalism,  and  that  on  a more  positive  note  they  were  voting  for  a 
Congress  that  would  promote  traditional  values.  When  Gallup  asked  whether  government  should 
promote  values,  55 percent  said that  government  should  promote  traditional  values;  37 percent 
said  that  government  shouldn’t  promote  any;  and  eight  percent  simply  had  no  opinion.  The  NES 
survey  approached  this  issue  in terms  of “traditional  family  ties.”  When  asked  whether  the 
country  would  have  fewer  problems  with  more  of an emphasis  on traditional  family  ties,  56.9 
percent  strongly  agreed  and  another  27.6  percent  agreed  somewhat.  Only  4.1  percent  disagreed 
strongly  and  2.1  percent  disagreed  somewhat.  Another  7.2  percent  neither  agreed  nor  disagreed. 
And  yet,  it still isn’t clear  as to  what  we  are  supposed  to  make  of all this,  for  what  meaning  can 
the  concept  of traditional  values  have  when  it isn’t clear  from  the  question  of  just  how  they  would 
be  defined. 
It  could  refer  to  alternative  lifestyles  or  different  moral  views  of the  world  which  might 
include  the  abortion  issue.  When  it was  suggested  that  new  lifestyles  are contributing  to  the 
breakdown  of  society,  37.1  percent  agreed  strongly  and  another  32.8  percent  agreed  somewhat. 
Only  8.4  percent  disagreed  somewhat  and  another  5.2 percent  disagreed  strongly.  13.9 percent 
simply  did  not  agree  or  disagree.  On the  other  hand,  when  the  issue  was  couched  differently,  the 
results  were  also  different.  When  respondents  were  told  that  the  world  is a changing  place  and 
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agreed  strongly  with  another  28.9  percent  agreeing  somewhat.  22.1  percent  disagreed  somewhat 
and  26.1%  disagreed  strongly.  An  additional  10.3 percent  neither  agreed  nor  disagreed.  When 
asked  for  their  views  on  abortion,  most  respondents  indicated  that  they  favored  freedom  of 
choice.  41.4 percent  indicated  that  women  should  always  be permitted  to  obtain  an abortion  as a 
matter  of personal  choice.  This  was  followed  by 29.6  percent  who  believed  that  abortion  should 
only  be permitted  in cases  of rape,  incest,  or that  the  women’s  life is in danger.  13.4 percent 
indicated  that  abortions  should  be permitted  for  reasons  other  than  rape,  incest,  and  saving  the 
mother’s  life, but  only  after  the  need  for  an abortion  has been  clearly  established.  And  only  11.9 
percent  believed  that  by law  abortion  should  never  be permitted.  An  additional  1.3 percent 
indicated  other  and  .8 percent  simply  did  not  know. 
Another  measure  of traditional  family  ties  might  be the  way  people  feel  about  the  women’s 
movement.  This  measure,  then,  rests  on the  premise  that  those  who  favor  so called  traditional 
values  are  also  opposed  to  equal  rights  for  women.  The  NJZS measured  attachment  to  the 
women’s  movement  by asking  respondents  to  situate  themselves  on  a feeling  thermometer  ranging 
from  0 to  100 with  0 representing  the  least  attachment  and  100 representing  the  most  attachment. 
About  38.2  percent  fell within  the  0 to  50 range  while  59.3  fell in the  51 to  100 range.  On the 
other  hand,  it also  doesn’t  follow  that  those  who  look  at the  women’s  movement  favorably  don’t 
also  believe  that  the  world  wouldn’t  be a better  place  with  more  traditional  family  ties. 
But  many  Republicans  took  the  election  to  be a clear  affirmation  of  conservative  values, 
particularly  with  regards  to  the  role  of government.  When  asked  to  indicate  their  attitudes  about 
the  role  of government,  fifteen  percent  indicated  that  they  were  liberal;  twenty  percent  indicated 
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they  were  conservative;  and  thirteen  percent  indicated  that  they  were  undesignated.  The  NES 
survey  asked  respondents  where  they  saw  themselves  on the  liberal/conservative  continuum,  but 
also divided  the  categories  into  degrees.  1.4 percent  saw themselves  as extremely  liberal;  6.4 
percent  saw  themselves  as liberal  and  7.8  percent  saw themselves  as slightly  liberal.  On the 
conservative  end,  14.6  percent  saw  themselves  as slightly  conservative;  18.1 percent  saw 
themselves  as conservative;  and  3.1  percent  saw themselves  as extremely  conservative.  On this 
basis,  there  are  more  conservatives  than  liberals:  35.8  v.  15.6. But  26.6  percent  saw  themselves  as 
moderates  and  an additional  20.6  percent  were  out  of the  universe  on this  question.  On the  other 
hand,  when  the  NES  attempted  to  measure  this  issue  via the  feeling  thermometer,  more 
individuals  were  clearly  conservative.  Specifically,  they  were  asked  to  situate  themselves  on  this 
thermometer  with  regards  to  their  attachment  to  conservatives.  38.8  percent  fell within  the  0  to  50 
range  while  53.7  percent  fell within  the  5 1 to  100 range. 
Still,  it isn’t  clear  that  these  results  indicate  a ringing  endorsement  of conservative  political 
ideology.  Were  it to  even  be assumed  that  libertarians  and  conservatives  share  the  same  attitudes 
about  government’s  role,  the  two  are not  really  the  same.  The  two  may  well  share  similar  views 
with  regards  to  government  intervention  in the  economy  and  questions  of taxation,  i.e. 
government  should  not  interfere  and  should  not  tax.  But  the  two  depart  significantly  when  it 
comes  to  social  issues.  Libertarians  are  consistent  when  it comes  to  government  interference  in 
individuals’  lives:  Government  should  not  interfere  in any aspect  of individuals  lives,  especially  on 
questions  concerning  morality,  for  when  it does  it violates  the  basic  principles  of liberty. 
Conservatives,  by contrast,  believe  that  government  can  interfere  in social  issues  for  the  creation 
26 of the  appropriate  moral  order.  On  an issue  like  abortion,  for  example,  conservatives  will  allow 
government  regulation,  whereas  libertarians  will not.  Truthfully,  the  categories  used  to  designate 
individuals’  attitudes  towards  government  aren’t entirely  helpful.  They  don’t  really  tell us what 
individuals  really  believe  about  what  government’s  role  ought  to  be.  To  simply  designate 
categories  is to  assume  that  it is well  known  what  these  groups  necessarily  believe  and  don’t 
believe.  And  yet,  these  monolithic  classifications  really  obscure  some  fundamental  distinctions 
between  categories,  as well  as distinctions  within  them.  The  Republican  “Contract”  clearly  takes 
aim  at liberalism,  but  liberalism  in contemporary  discourse  is never  really  defined  beyond  the 
simplistic  slogan  of tax  and  spend.  In reality,  liberalism  is a highly  complex  concept  which  has 
meant  different  things  to  different  people  at different  times.  And  what  it often  encompasses  as a 
political  philosophy  are the  other  classifications  which,  in the  polls,  are used  as alternatives  to  it.31 
Moreover,  it isn’t  inconceivable  that  because  the  term  liberal  has  acquired  such  a pejorative 
meaning  that  persons  with  “liberal”  views  may  not  see themselves  as liberals,  or  at least  they 
choose  not  to  be labeled  as such.. 
Ladd  has  suggested  that  the  central  issue  was  perhaps  the  desire  to  see  a more  limited 
central  government,  and  he bases  this  claim  on  the  observation  that  the  public  generally  favored 
those  “contract”  provisions  that  pertained  to  limiting  government.32  But  when  the  question  was 
approached  in terms  of federal  spending  in specific  areas,  the  claim  that  the  public  would  like  to 
See,  for  example,  Oren  M.  Levin-Waldman,  Plant  Closure,  Regulation  and  Liberalism:  The 
Limits  to Liberal  Public  PhiIosophy  (Lanham,  MD;  University  Press  of America,  1992) 
particularly  chapters  3 & 4; and Reconceiving  Liberalism:  Dilemmas  of  Contemporary  Liberal 
Public  Policy  (Pittsburgh,  University  of Pittsburgh  Press,  forthcoming);  also  see  Stephen  Holmes, 
The Anatomy  of Antiliberalism  (Cambridge,  MA;  Harvard  University  Press,  1993) 
32  Ladd,  “The  1994  Congressional  Elections,  p.  10 
27 see  less government  actually  becomes  inconsistent.  When  NES  asked  whether  the  federal 
government  needs  to  spend  more  money  on  health  and  education  even  if it meant  that  ordinary 
people  would  pay  more  taxes,  15.4 percent  agreed  strongly  and  43 percent  agreed  somewhat. 
Only  24.2  percent  disagreed  somewhat,  with  15.3 percent  disagreeing  strongly.  At  least  57.4 
percent  agreed  with  the  proposition  that  more  should  be  spent  on  health  and  education  and  only 
39.5  percent  did  not.  When  asked  whether  they  thought  society  should  do  whatever  is necessary 
to  make  sure  that  everyone  has  an equal  opportunity  to  succeed,  6 1.3 percent  agreed  strongly  and 
another  25.4  percent  agreed  somewhat.  Only  5.6 percent  disagreed  somewhat  and  2.5  percent 
disagreed  strongly,  with  4.1  percent  neither  agreeing  nor  disagreeing.  Again,  86.7  percent 
generally  agreed  with  the  proposition  while  only  12.2 percent  disagreed.  That  an overwhelming 
majority  believes  that  society  ought  to  doesn’t  mean  that  government  should.  The  distinction 
between  government  and  society  is a traditional  one  with  deep  roots  in political  theory. 
The  NES  survey  asked  a series  of questions  about  whether  federal  spending  for  certain 
programs  ought  to  be increased,  remain  the  same  or  decreased.  Though  there  was  some  variation 
depending  on the  specific  program,  overall  there  was  no  real  indication  that  respondents  wanted 
to  see less  spending  on  most  things.  This  can be  seen  in Table  I. 
Table  I  Attitudes  about  Federal  Spending 
Policy  Increased  Same  Decreased  Don  ‘t Know  Inapp. 
Environment  39.2  47.8  10.5  1.9  .5 
Foreign  Aid  6.9  36.0  54.0  2.6  .6 
Social  Security  50.3  42.5  4.7  1.8  .8 
Welfare  programs  12.5  32.3  51.7  2.8  .7 
AIDS  research  48.7  34.9  13.4  2.4  .6 
Food  stamps  9.3  45.9  40.9  3.0  .9 
Public  schools  66.8  24.5  6.6  1.6  .6 
28 Child  care  54.0  33.1  9.1  3.0  .7 
Crime  73.4  19.6  4.5  1.8  .7 
Healthcare  61.9  26.6  9.1  1.8  .6 
Defense  22.4  46.5  28.9  1.7  .5 
If the  responses  with  regards  to  most  of these  issues  were  to  be placed  on  a continuum,  most 
people,  it would  appear,  would  fall into  the  category  of keeping  funding  where  it is, at a 
minimum,  or increasing  it.  There  are  nonetheless  some  interesting  anomalies  to  what  we  might 
expect  were  it true  that  the  public  would  prefer  less government.  The  school  issue  is particularly 
interesting  because  public  education  is traditionally  a function  of local  government.  If the  issue  in 
1994  was  a desire  to  return  to  a phase  of  “dual  federalism”  where  the  states  and  the  national 
government  are  co-equal  in their  respective  spheres  of  sovereignty,  why  would  they  want  to 
increase  federal  spending  on  schools?  This  is precisely  a policy  sphere  which  symbolizes  local  self- 
rule.  The  welfare  issue  was  also  interesting.  Although,  as to  be expected,  more  people  wanted  to 
see  federal  spending  on welfare  programs  decreased,  the  number  that  wanted  to  see food  stamps 
decreased  actually  declined.  Whereas  close  to  52 percent  wanted  to  see  spending  on  welfare 
programs  decreased,  40.9  percent  wanted  to  see  federal  spending  on  food  stamps  decreased.  On 
the  other  hand,  considerably  more  people  wanted  to  see federal  spending  on  child  care  increased. 
To  the  extent  that  federal  spending  may  be  a measure  of the  size and  presence  of the  federal 
government,  there  is little  indication  that  its role  should  be reduced.  On the  contrary,  on  most 
issues  the  role  of the  federal  government  should  remain  the  same,  and  in some  cases  it should  be 
increased. 
Also,  when  it came  to  the  issue  of the  federal  deficit,  an issue  also  symbolic  of federal 
spending,  respondents  simply  did  not  think  it as important  an issue  as did  Republican  members  of 
29 Congress.  When  asked  whether  the  federal  deficit  should  be reduced  even  if it meant  that  ordinary 
people  would  have  to  pay  more  in taxes,  11.4 percent  agreed  strongly  and  30.9  percent  agreed 
somewhat.  But  29  percent  disagreed  somewhat  with  an additional  26.6  percent  disagreeing 
strongly.  And  when  asked  whether  the  federal  deficit  should  be reduced  even  if it would  mean 
spending  less  on  health  and  education,  only  8.6 percent  agreed  strongly  with  an additional  20.3 
percent  agreeing  somewhat.  36.5  percent  disagreed  somewhat  and  32.5  percent  disagreed 
strongly.  Therefore,  it isn’t  entirely  clear  that  a case  can be made  that  the  budget  deficit  was  that 
critical  an issue. 
Perhaps  the  issue  is the  institution  of Congress.  Americans  have  traditionally  divided  on 
the  issue  of Congress.  While  the  public  generally  finds  fault  with  the  institution  of Congress, 
respondents  generally  tend  to  like their  own  representative.  This  election  appears  to  be no 
exception.  Overall,  most  of those  polled  by Gallup  indicated  that  they  would  reelect  their  own 
representative,  but  they  would  not  reelect  most  of Congress.  When  asked  whether  their  own 
representative  deserved  to  be reelected,  53 percent  said yes;  29 percent  said  no;  and  18 percent 
had  no  opinion.  But  when  asked  whether  most  members  of Congress  deserved  to  be  reelected,  39 
percent  said yes;  45  percent  said no;  and  16 percent  had  no  opinion.  On the  other  hand,  when  the 
NES  asked  whether  they  approved  or  disapproved  of the  way  Congress  was  handling  its job,  61.8 
percent  indicated  that  they  disapproved;  30.3  percent  indicated  that  they  approved  and  7.6 
percent  simply  did  not  know.  On the  other  hand,  if there  was  any issue  in  1994  which  best 
captured  the  public  sentiment  towards  Congress,  it was  that  of term  limits.  In the  NES  survey, 
respondents  were  asked  whether  they  favored  or opposed  an amendment  which  would  limit 
members  of Congress  to  no  more  that  twelve  consecutive  years,  75 percent  said they  favored  such 
30 an amendment,  and  only  19.8 percent  said that  they  were  opposed.  Another  1.7 percent  indicated 
other  and  3 percent  simply  did  not  know. 
The  issue  that  really  stands  out  is that  individuals  were  by and  large  dissatisfied  with  the 
way  things  were  going  in the  U.S.  at the  time  of the  election,  although  it still isn’t  entirely  clear 
what  this  means.  By the  end  of November  1994,  about  three  weeks  following  the  election, 
according  to  Gallup,  67 percent  said that  they  were  dissatisfied  while  only  29 percent  indicated 
that  they  were  satisfied  and  four  percent  had  no  opinion.  And  when  asked  whether  they  believed 
those  policies  proposed  by Republican  leaders  in Congress  would  move  the  country  in the  right  or 
wrong  direction,  55 percent  said  it was  the  right  direction,  27 percent  said  it was  the  wrong 
direction,  and  eighteen  percent  had  no  opinion.  Interestingly,  however,  the  question  of policies 
was  posed  as a general  question  with  no  specific  mention  made  of the  “Contract  with  America.” 
On the  other  hand,  when  the  NES  survey  asked  which  party  they  thought  would  do  a better  job 
handling  the  nation’s  economy,  50.2  percent  indicated  that  there  was  no  difference.  15.2 percent 
said the  Democrats;  30.4  percent  said the  Republicans;  and  1.6 percent  said  neither.  When  they 
were  asked  which  party  would  do  a better  job  at making  health  care  more  affordable,  37.6 
percent  said the  Democrats  and  only  20.6  percent  said the  Republicans.  34 percent  had  indicated 
that  it made  no  real  difference  and  3.3  percent  said neither.  But  the  Republicans  did  have  the  edge 
when  it came  to  the  issue  of welfare  reform.  36.5  percent  said the  Republicans  would  do  a better 
job  while  only  21.9  percent  said that  the  Democrats  would  do  a better  job.  34.3  percent  believed 
that  there  was  no  real difference  and  3 percent  indicated  that  neither  party  would  do  a better  job. 
Interestingly,  however,  when  it came  to  the  issue  of which  party  was  more  likely  to  raise  taxes  -- 
an issue  the  Republicans  accuse  the  Democrats  of being  guilty  of -- 57.5  percent  said that  there 
31 was  not  much  difference  between  the  two  parties.  After  that,  28 percent  thought  that  the 
Democrats  would  be more  likely  to  raise  taxes  and  only  11.6 percent  thought  the  Republicans 
would  be  more  likely;  2.4  percent  simply  did  not  know. 
Still,  it isn’t  clear  what  people  mean  when  they  say they  are  dissatisfied  or what  it means 
for  things  to  be  moving  in the  right  direction.  In  1992 the  Democrats  swept  to  power  on  a 
platform  of change,  and  it could  well  be that  the  failure  of the  Democratic  party  to  deliver  that 
change  that  may  account  for  many  of the  perceptions  of the  Republicans  being  the  party  now 
most  able  to  move  the  country  in the  right  direction.  When  looking  at specific  issues,  there  is in 
the  Gallup  polls  a virtual  reversal  of the  public’s  perceptions  about  the  ability  of Democrats  vs. 
Republicans  to  solve  certain  problems  from  December  1992 to  November  1994.  The  differences 
between  1992  and  1994  can be  seen  in Table  II. 
Table  II  Who  Does  a Better  Job  (Percentages) 
Issue 
1992  1994 
Democrats  Republicans  Democrats  Republicans 
Unemployment  61  23  41  48 
Healthcare  64  21  41  46 
Economy  57  28  33  54 
Taxes  44  37  30  57 
Budget  deficit  53  25  31  52 
Welfare  reform  47  36  35  55 
It  is interesting  to  note  that  even  on traditional  Republican  issues  like  taxes,  the  federal  budget 
deficit  and  welfare  reform,  there  were  reversals  from  1992  --when  there  was  a greater  sense  that 
the  Democrats  could  accomplish  things.  If the  Republican  victory  in  1994 represents  an episode  in 
a larger  trend,  how,  then,  do  we  account  for  such  strong  support  for  the  Democrats  in  1992?  If a 
trend,  it would  have  to  follow  that  1992 was  merely  a deviation  from  the  norm.  But  it isn’t  clear 
32 based  on  the  survey  that  such  a determination  can be made.  If anything,  the  data  may  appear  to 
lend  support  for  the  traditional  model  of rejecting  the  incumbent.  Or it might  be inferred  that  the 
greater  hope  attributed  to  the  Democrats  in  1992 was  a function  of the  fact  that  the  Democrats 
then  were  perceived  to  be more  in touch  with  the  public,  whereas  the  Republicans  were  not.  That 
more  people  see the  Republicans  as more  able may  not  speak  so much  for  Republican  ability  as it 
does  for  the  sense  that  the  Democrats  have  simply  lost  touch. 
All these  issues  were  precisely  those  on which  Clinton  campaigned  on  a platform  of 
change  in  1992.  That  many  have  not  been  happy  with  the  way  things  have  been  going  and  many 
also  disapproved  of the  President’s  performance  in office  may  merely  indicate  that  the  public 
believes  that  Clinton  and  his party  failed  to  deliver  the  change  that  was  promised.  The  problem 
was  that  the  principal  obstruction  to  change  came  not  necessarily  from  the  White  House,  but  from 
the  Democratic  leadership  in Congress.  The  change  that  Clinton  promised  was  principally  a 
reform  of the  nation’s  healthcare  system.  The  Democratic  leadership,  having  its own  political 
agenda,  did  quite  a bit to  thwart  the  effort.  And  as seen  in the  NES  data,  an overwhelming 
majority  was  dissatisfied  over  health  care  reform.  It is also  interesting  to  note  that  when  the  NES 
data  are  selected  on  the  basis  of those  who  disapproved  of the  way  Congress  was  handling  the 
healthcare  reform  issue,  the  percentage  of those  disapproving  of the  way  Congress  overall  has 
been  handling  its job  also  increased  as well.  Whereas  the  general  percentage  of disapproval  was 
61.8  percent,  it was  72.6  percent  among  those  who  disapproved  of the  way  that  Congress  was 
handling  healthcare  reform.  Meanwhile  the  percentage  of approval  among  this  group  was  only 
22.4  percent  compared  to  30.3  among  the  general  sample.  Also  those  who  disapproved  of how 
Congress  handled  healthcare  reform  also  had  a higher  disapproval  of Clinton’s  handling  of  his job 
33 as president  as well.  For  this  group,  the  disapproval  of Clinton’s  job  as president  was  49.6  percent 
compared  to  46.1  percent  among  the  general  sample.  And  his approval  among  this  group  was 
only  45.8  percent  compared  to  48.2  percent  among  the  general  sample.  Moreover,  those  who 
disapproved  of the  way  Congress  was  handling  healthcare  reform  were  also  likely  to  have  a higher 
disapproval  of  Clinton’s  handling  of healthcare  reform  as well.  The  general  disapproval  of 
Clinton’s  handling  of health  care  reform  was  59 percent;  the  disapproval  of those  who 
disapproved  of Congress’s  handling  of health  care  was  66 percent.  The  actual  approval  rate 
dropped  from  33.4  percent  to  28.5  percent.  It would  appear  that  the  most  important  variable  in 
explaining  why  the  Democratic  Congress  was  removed  from  power  was  the  issue  of healthcare 
reform. 
It wasn’t  clear,  however,  as to  whether  public  dissatisfaction  was  a function  of the  specific 
proposals  made  by  Clinton,  or the  fact  that  he failed  to  deliver  on  the  issue.  For  when  asked 
whether  they  thought  it an important  issue,  an overwhelming  majority  thought  that  it was.  In the 
wake  of this  failure,  the  answer  from  voters  may  well  have  been  a pocks  on  both  houses.  And  yet, 
the  inability  of a Democratic  congress  to  work  with  a Democratic  president  doesn’t  necessarily 
represent  a political  crisis  as much  as perhaps  the  straw  that  broke  the  camel’s  back.  It may  well 
speak  to  the  corruption  of leadership,  the  same  leadership  which  in  1992  and  years  before 
appeared  to  be the  source  of gridlock.  Gridlock,  however,  never  disappeared.  It was  also  the 
same  leadership  that  presided  over  ethical  lapses  such  as the  House  banking  scandal,  which  did 
much  to  call into  question  the  credibility  of Congress  in the  minds  of the  public. 
At the  same  time,  however,  there  are a couple  of problems  with  the  realignment  model  as 
it may  be  applied  to  1994.  For  one  thing,  it isn’t  at all clear  from  the  electoral  results  that  the 
34 electorate  has  changed  its party  affiliation.  It certainly  wasn’t  clear  from  the  Gallup  poll  what  the 
party  affiliations  were,  and  the  NES  survey  never  really  asked.  The  NES  survey  did  raise  the 
question  in terms  of which  party  respondents  felt they  most  closely  identified  with.  Although  this 
isn’t  the  same  as formal  party  identification  as measured  by party  registrations,  it is perhaps  the 
measure  in these  data  of whether  there  has been  any  real  change  in party  identifications  in the 
electorate.  For  a realignment  to  occur,  it really  isn’t  enough  to  look  at how  many  House  and 
Senate  seats  the  Republicans  obtained.  The  real  question  is whether  the  public  feels  more 
comfortable  being  identified  as Republicans,  for  if they  do  not  the  election  may  be no  more  than 
another  political  anomaly.  When  respondents  were  asked  how  they  thought  of themselves,  34.1 
percent  said that  they  thought  of themselves  of as Democrats,  and  30.3  percent  thought  of 
themselves  as Republicans.  But  28.6  percent  thought  of themselves  as Independents,  and  it is this 
number  which  is significant.  For  if there  was  a true  realignment,  we  would  expect  to  see  few 
independents  and  an overwhelming  majority  thinking  of themselves  as Republicans.  And  yet  the 
indication  here  is that  a sizeable  percentage  of the  electorate  sees  itself  as independent  and 
considers  itself  free  to  choose  to  go  after  whichever  party  best  fits its needs  at any give  time.  In 
addition,  6.3  percent  simply  had  no  preference.  When  the  NES  attempted  to  gain  a sense  of how 
respondents  felt  about  each  party  via the  feeling  thermometer,  with  0 representing  cold  feelings 
and  100 representing  warm  feelings,  it wasn’t  entirely  clear  that  the  Republican  party  had  that 
much  of an edge  over  the  Democratic  party.  On the  Democratic  party,  48.9  percent  fell in the  O- 
50 range,  while  49.2  percent  fell in the  51 to  100 range.  And  on  the  Republican  party,  44.8 
percent  fell in the  0 to  50 range  while  53 percent  fell in the  5 1 to  100 range.  But  that  respondents 
felt  favorable  or unfavorable  about  either  party  may  really  say very  little  about  how  much  they 
35 really  support  them. 
Even  when  it comes  to  those  who  do  see themselves  as one  party  or the  other,  it is not 
clear  that  those  identifications  are very  strong.  When  they  were  asked  whether  they  would  call 
themselves  either  strong  Republican  or not  very  strong  Republican,  and/or  strong  Democrat  or 
not  very  strong  Democrat,  33 percent  said not  very  strong  and  only  3 1.1 percent  said  strong.  35.6 
percent  were  simply  out  of the  universe  on  this  question,  which  actually  is close  to  the  combined 
percentage  of those  who  considered  themselves  independents  and  had  no  preference.  What  this 
data  would  seem  to  suggest  is that  this  election  was  perhaps  another  episode  in a trend  towards 
dealignment,  rather  than  realignment.  Interestingly,  when  respondents  were  asked  how  favorable 
they  were  to  political  parties  in general  on the  feeling  thermometer,  55.7  percent  fell in the  0 to  50 
range,  while  only  40.5  percent  fell in the  5 1 to  100 range.  Still to  assess  this  we  might  have  to 
look  at party  trends  over  the  years  and  examine  the  whole  concept  of dealignment.  And  the  other 
problem  with  the  realignment  model  is that  it isn’t  clear  from  this  election  that  there  was  a single 
issue,  or  set  of issues,  which  so polarized  the  nation.  At  no time  in the  Gallup  poll,  for  instance, 
were  people  asked  what  specific  issue  or  issues  caused  them  to  overwhelmingly  reject  the 
Democratic  majority  in Congress  in favor  of the  Republicans,  nor  was  it any  more  clear  from  the 
NES  survey. 
Lessons? 
There  is no  question  that  something  happened  in  1994,  but  a majority  party  in government 
__ even  if it yells  “revolution”  -- is no  real proof  of a realignment.  Still, this  doesn’t  dismiss  the 
issue  entirely.  Or perhaps  the  focus  on traditional  realignment  is simply  wrong,  though  this  isn’t  to 
36 say that  there  aren’t  elements  of it. According  to  John  Aldrich,  it is perhaps  time  to  rethink  some 
of these  concepts.  The  “party-in-the  electorate”  concept  as developed  by Key  may  no  longer  be 
terribly  useful.  Rather  the  concept  should  more  properly  be referred  to  as “party-in-elections.” 
According  to  Aldrich,  this  term  can “encompass  the  electorate’s  views  of,  and  identification  with, 
parties  and  the  organizational  arrangements  parties  design  to  affect  the  views,  identifications,  and 
most  of all, voting  behavior  of the  public  in elections.“33  To  some  extent,  the  traditional 
realignment  model  assumes  that  the  mass  party  model  developed  in the  mid-nineteenth  century 
and  prevalent  until  about  1960  still exists;  it no  longer  does.  Instead  more  and  more  people  see 
themselves  as independents.  As Aldrich  explains: 
The  decline  of Key’s  parties-in-the-electorate  can  apparently  be  attributed  to  voters 
plausible  perceptions  that  parties  were  indeed  less  relevant  to  them  in elections  than  were 
the  direct  observations  of the  candidates.  This  clear  and  sustaining  shift  from  party- 
centered  to  candidate-centered  (or  at least  to  party-and-candidate-centered)  elections 
resolves  the  puzzle  of how  voters  can perceive  clear  partisan  differences  in policy  stances 
but  care  less  about  parties  in themselves.  They  see parties  as increasingly  irrelevant  to  their 
decision  making,  or  in effect  they  do  not  bother  to  “see”  the  parties  at a11.34 
In  other  words,  the  party  system  that  reigned  from  the  1860s  began  to  collapse  around  the  1960s. 
And  the  196Os, as many  have  suggested  were,  a critical  period  in American  politics,  but  Aldrich 
sees  it as having  a very  different  meaning  than  those  who  have  latched  onto  traditional 
realignment  theory.  The  1960s  were  critical  because  of sweeping  and  fundamental  changes  in 
American  politics,  especially  in public  opinion  and  electoral  behavior,  and  this  occurred  following 
a period  of relative  stability.  And  on this  basis,  many  commentators  may  have  been  misled  into 
33  John  II.  Aldrich,  Why Parties?  The Origin and Transformation of Political  Parties  in 
America  (Chicago,  University  of Chicago  Press,  1995),  pp.  165 , 260 
34  Aldrich,  Why Parties?,  p. 253 
37 believing  that  the  1960s  was  a realignment.  And  yet,  that  is the  point.  There  were  important 
elements  of a partisan  realignment,  but  the  events  of the  1960s  were  events  “associated  with  a 
critical  era that  led  to  fundamental  changes  in the  institutional  bases  of political  parties.”  At the 
same  time,  the  Democratic  advantage  in Congress  was  really  unaffected  by the  events  of the 
1960s. 
The  basis  for  many  claims  that  a realignment  had  occurred  at least  in  1968  is the  fact  that 
Republicans  won  every  presidential  election  since  1968 with  the  exception  of  1976  and  1992.  At 
the  same  time,  however,  the  election  of  1968 wasn’t  a realignment  in the  sense  that  1932 was.  It 
wasn’t  brought  about  by sharp  forces  which  produced  a strong  reaction  against  the  majority  party. 
Although  any  number  of conservatives  who  witnessed  the  debacle  of the  1968 Democratic 
convention  and  viewed  the  Democratic  party  as symbolizing  lawlessness  and  disorder,  the  election 
really  came  to  symbolize  the  beginning  of a trend.  In part,  the  trend  in the  South  began  as early  as 
1948  when  the  dixiecrats  bolted  the  Democratic  party  and  voted  for  South  Carolina  governor 
Strom  Thurmond  because  of his  strong  anti-civil  rights  stand.  But  following  1968,  any  number  of 
southern  states  would  continue  to  vote  for  the  Republican  candidate  in presidential  elections.3s 
Burnham  too  also  noted  that  if it was  the  case  that  deviations  from  the  norms  of American  politics 
in  1968  were  part  of a critical  realignment,  they  must  be viewed  as an intermediate  stage  in a 
larger  disruption.36 
But  also  given  that  the  Democratic  majority  maintained  its position  in both  chambers  for 
most  of the  time,  the  only  real  result  has been  divided  partisan  control  of the  national 
3s See  Philips,  The Emerging  Repubiican Majority 
36  Burnham,  Critical Elections  and the Mainsprings  of American Politics,  p.  142 
38 government.  So  in this  sense,  there  has been  no  realignment  since  the  critical  era  of the  1960s.  But 
the  second  sense  in which  there  has  been  no  realignment  is that  “there  was  no  aggregate  shift  in 
the  balance  of partisan  loyalties  in the  electorate.”  Even  though  there  were  some  changes  in party 
identification,  the  affect  was  so minimal  that  the  end  result  could  not  be considered  a partisan 
Prior  to  the  critical  era  of the  196Os, candidates  had  no  alternative  to  using  party 
organizations  to  gain  access  to  office.  Parties,  in short,  held  an effective  monopoly  over  resources. 
What  the  1968  election  did was  usher  in an era  of party  reform  which  essentially  led  to  greater 
reliance  on  primary  elections  and  participatory  caucuses  as the  basis  for  party  nomination.  This 
then  meant  that  anyone  with  the  resources  to  create  a campaign  organization  could  potentially 
receive  the  party’s  nomination  without  having  to  demonstrate  the  type  of partisan  loyalty  which  in 
the  past  had  been  obligatory.38  For  Aldrich,  the  key  point  is that  it became  possible  for  ambitious 
politicians  to  win  both  nominations  and  elections  without  relying  on  parties.  The  critical  era  itself 
did  not  create  a new  institutional  form  of party;  it simply  meant  the  death  of the  old.  The  critical 
era  did  occur  on  time  insofar  as it was  approximately  thirty  years  after  the  New  Deal  realignment, 
but  it led to  changes  in partisan  institutional  form  rather  than  changes  in partisan  alignment.39  Or 
to  state  it differently,  because  the  criterion  of periodicity  appeared  to  have  been  met,  there  was 
perhaps  the  appearance  of a realignment,  when  in fact  there  was  none. 
37  Aldrich,  Why Parties?,  pp.  263,  265 
38  See Nelson  W. Polsby,  Consequences of Party Reform  (Oxford  and  New  York,  Oxford 
University  Press,  1983) 
39  Aldrich,  Kky  Parties?,  pp.  272-273,  278-279 
39 All this  may  be true,  but  as to  which  is cause  and  effect  may  be  somewhat  debatable.  The 
major  reforms  in the  political  parties  did  not  occur  until  after  the  1968  election.  The  call to  reform 
the  nominating  process  was  in response  to  the  fact  that  Hubert  Humphrey,  the  Democratic 
Presidential  candidate  had  secured  the  nomination  the  traditional  route  through  back  door 
negotiations  with  state  party  leaders.  He  had  not  entered  a single  primary  and  those  who  had 
supported  Robert  Kennedy  and  Eugene  McCarthy  -- both  of whom  had  gone  through 
election  process  -- had  by the  time  of the  Convention  come  to  believe  that  Humphrey 
the  primary 
illegitimately  obtained  the  party  nomination.  This  coupled  with  the  spectacle  of a convention 
amidst  protest  and  violence  on the  streets  outside  the  convention  venter  on National  television  for 
everybody  to  see  may  have  ultimately  been  the  source  of Nixon’s  victory.  Reforms  then  began  in 
the  Democratic  party  out  of the  belief  that  a more  open  nominating  process  would  lead  to  a more 
inclusive  political  party,  which  would  enable  it to  regain  the  White  House  in  1972.  The 
Republican  party,  then,  followed  suit.40 To  obtain  these  reforms,  election  laws  effectively  had  to 
be  changed  on  a state  by  state  basis.  But  once  implemented,  the  end  result  was  that  anybody  who 
was  not  necessarily  closely  involved  with  the  traditional  party  organization  but  who  had  an 
effective  organization,  raised  enough  money,  and  was  able to  mobilize  enough  support  might 
obtain  the  party’s  nomination.  In the  end  party  organizations  lost  control  of their  most  precious 
resource  -- the  ability  to  control  nominations  and  elections.  And  the  prime  beneficiaries  were 
unknown  candidates  who  otherwise  might  never  have  been  catapulted  into  the  national  arena,  like 
George  McGovern  in  1972,  Jimmy  Carter  in  1976,  and  even  Ronald  Reagan  in  1980.  At the  same 
time,  these  reforms  also  made  it easier  for  incumbent  presidents  like  Gerald  Ford  in  1976,  Jimmy 
4o See  Polsby,  Consequences  of Party  Reform 
40 Carter  in  1980  and  George  Bush  in  1992 to  face  a challenge  from  within  their  own  parties. 
Another  way  to  think  of this  is that  parties  no  longer  provide  the  types  of  social  services 
they  did  during  their  heyday  of the  last  century.  Prior  to  the  Progressive  era  and  the  rise  of good 
government  and  civil  service  systems,  parties  used  to  deliver  an array  of  social  services  in 
exchange  for  votes.41  As they  no  longer  distribute  services  and  they  no  longer  control 
nominations,  they  have  increasingly  become  vehicles  for  mobilizing  the  electorate  behind 
particular  candidates.  They  are,  in essence,  nothing  more  than  middlemen  towards  the  attainment 
of a particular  objective:  winning  the  election.  And  yet,  given  the  trends  in dealignment,  it would 
be too  complacent  for  the  new  Republican  majority  to  assume  that  because  they  swept  the 
Congress  in  1994,  we  are in a new  era in which  the  Republican  party  agenda  can  reign  supreme. 
On this  point,  the  polling  data  is vague.  The  best  evidence  against  a realignment  is that  there  has 
been  no  overwhelming  shift  in the  electorate  and  no  clear  issue  which  could  so polarize  the  nation 
along  the  lines  of existing  political  cleavage.  If anything,  the  lessons  of dealignment  suggest  the 
need  for  anybody  in power,  whether  they  be Democrats  or Republicans,  to  constantly  be in touch 
with  the  electorate  at all times. 
Something  was  clearly  bothering  the  public  in  1994,  and  it may  well  have  been  that  the 
leadership  in Congress  really  wasn’t  in touch,  and  therefore  the  majority  in power  had  to  be 
displaced.  To  this  extent,  1994  continues  the  trend  of  1992 whereby  the  electorate  rejected  an 
incumbent  president  who  was  perceived  to  be out  of touch  as well.  But  it isn’t  clear  from  the  data 
that  the  Republican  majority  with  its agenda  is any more  in touch.  The  Republican  majority,  in the 
41  See,  for  example,  Amy  Bridges,  A City in the Republic: Antebellum  New York and the 
Origins of Machine  Politics  (Ithaca  and  London,  Cornell  University  Press,  1987) 
41 name  of Revolution,  continues  to  put  forth  an agenda,  especially  as reflected  in budget  talks,  for 
limiting  the  Federal  government.  But  as survey  data  suggest,  it also  isn’t  clear  that  is what  the 
public  wants  either.  To  merely  assume  that  a sweep  means  overwhelming  public  support  for  a 
particular  ideological  agenda  may  reflect  wishful  thinking  with  no  bearing  in reality  and  could 
prove  to  have  disastrous  consequences. 
42 